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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
THE INADEQUACY OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN MISSOURI
CRIMINAL CASES
Equality before the law in a true democracy is a matter of right. It can-
not be a matter of charity or of favor or of grace or of discretion.
- ustice Rutledgel
A deluge of protest has been heard concerning courts and court philosophies.
The protestors have had many topics from which to choose, but criminal justice
is high in priority of attack. Many persons feel criminal rules and procedures
have relaxed to the point that society is suffering. But even these critics should
hesitate to campaign against liberalization of criminal discovery procedures for
this proposal is not intended to give criminal defendants an advantage, nor is it
urged to lessen any discovery advantage the state may have. Its purpose is that
of the more liberal rules of civil discovery--exposure of the truth.
I. PRESENT APPLICABLE LAW-GENERALLY
By statute and rule, criminal defendants in Missouri have very limited pre-
trial discovery available to them. The names of all material witnesses must be
endorsed on indictments and informations.2 Cross-examination of the state's wit-
nesses is allowed at the preliminary hearing.8
At common law defendants in criminal cases were denied discovery because
of the fear that it would subvert justice.4 What remains of the common law still
1. Address to the American Bar Association, 1941, in Allison & Seymour,
The Supreme Court and the Doctrine of the Right to Counsel, 46 J. AM. Jim. Soc'y
259, 265 (1963).
2. § 545.070, RSMo 1959 provides: "When an indictment is found by the
grand jury, the names of all the material witnesses must be indorsed upon the
indictment .... "
§ 545.240, RSMo 1959 states inter alia: "The names of the witnesses for the
prosecution must be indorsed on the information, in like manner and subject to
the same restrictions as required in case of indictments."
Mo. R. Cumt. P. 24.17 incorporates nearly the identical wording of § 545.070,
RSMo 1959 into one provision for both informations and indictments.
§ 545.320, RSMo 1959 denies the issuance of a subpoena in favor of the state
for a state's witness unless his name appeared on the indictment or information.
This requirement, however, may be circumvented by the provision that the
prosecutor can file an an affidavit that other witnesses are "positively necessary
for a complete adjudication of the case .... "
In addition, Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) provides that "the accused shall have
the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf . . . ." This article would not seem
to grant the defendant any right of pretrial discovery; only that he is to be assured
of these rights upon trial.
3. § 544.250, RSMo 1959 guarantees the right of preliminary examination
before a magistrate. Mo. R. Cam. P. 23.02 is in accord. §§ 544.270, .280, .380 also
deal with the preliminary hearing.
Mo. R. Cam. P. 23.03 allows the accused to cross-examine the prosecution's
witnesses at the preliminary hearing.
4. Comment, 60 YALE LJ. 626 (1951).
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speaks of injustice for defendants. Blair, J., in Ex Parte Welborn5 attacks a re-
maining element-the secrecy of grand jury proceedings:
That was a part of a system which denied the defendant counsel, kept
him in close confinement until the hour of trial, refused him the right
to call witnesses, sent juries to jail for returning verdicts of acquittal
and which, in short, was devised to convict the accused rather than to
try the truth charged against him. In many respects, including the fea-
ture now pressed upon our attention, the rule in England has been
changed by statutes . . . under which a criminal trial bears greater re-
semblance to a legal proceeding. 6
Admittedly, modem day procedures grant today's defendant many more
rights than his ancestor, but still the criminal trial does not resemble the ideal
"legal proceeding" as closely as it could.
State v. Aubuclon7 enunciates the rule which Missouri courts follow. As stated
in that case: "There is no general ig/ut of discovery by statute or rule in Mis-
souri criminal cases." (Emphasis added.) Disclosure may be obtained only by the
exercise of the court's discretion. In determining whether or not to exercise dis-
cretion, courts look mainly to the factors of materiality, admissability and neces-
sity.
II. PRESENT APPLICABLE LAw-SPEciFicALLY
The five categories where discovery is the most important for the defendant
are: copies of grand jury minutes; evidence, documents and scientific reports in
the possession of the state; lists of potential witnesses; depositions; and, finally,
confessions and statements of the defendant.
A. Grand Iiry Testimony
The general rule regarding disclosure of grand jury minutes is: "In the absence
of a statute otherwise providing, the accused is not entitled to inspect the grand
jury minutes as of right, but such inspection may in the court's discretion be
granted."' 0
In State ex rel. Clagett v. James" it was stated:
[Iinspection of a grand jury transcript should not be permitted for pur-
poses of discovery or as a substitute for taking depositions of witnesses
endorsed on an indictment but only when and to the extent that it is
shown to be necessary to meet the ends of justice.'2
5. 237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 31 (1911).
6. Id. at 304, 141 S.W. at 34.
7. 381 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1964).
8. Id. at 813.
9. Id., at 813 contains a collection of the cases supporting the widely accepted
rule of discretionary discovery. The criteria referred to will be discussed more
fully in the text; they are also commonplace requirements.
10. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 956 (1961).
.11. 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
12. Id. at 290.
19661
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Following this case, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the rule that in-
spection of grand jury testimony would be permitted
upon a finding of necessity to meet the ends of justice, preliminary to or
in connection with a judicial proceeding either civil or criminal or when
permitted by the court upon a particularized showing by the defendant
that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because
of matters occurring before the Grand Jury.13
The supreme court should have stopped at this point, but it continued in a
wholesale adoption of the Clagett rule. 14 The supreme court rule is therefore not
effective as a discovery device. The Clagett case points out that inspection, if
allowed, should be of only that part of the transcript which would be admissible
in evidence.15 A motion to examine a transcript was denied in State v. McDonald,10
when it was shown that the only use the defendant could make of it was the possi-
ble impeachment of witnesses by showing inconsistent statements.1" However, once
the grand jury's indictment is made public, witnesses who previously appeared be-
fore the grand jury may be required to testify about their former testimony.' 8
The theory of requiring secrecy of grand jury proceedings has been severely criti-
cized.19
B. Evidence, Docwments and Scientific Reports
Disclosure in the pretrial stage of scientific reports, documents (including wit-
nesses' statements) and other evidentiary material in the possession of the state
is of primary importance to the defendant. Discovery is permissable only at the
discretion of the court, and the defendant is afforded no general right either by
13. Mo. R. CGmM. P. 24.24.
14. Mo. R. CM. P. 24.24 continues by saying that "Disclosure shall not be
permitted by inspection of transcripts of testimony for purposes of discovery
or as a substitute for taking depositions of witnesses indorsed on an indict-
ment and no inspection of clerk's minutes shall be permitted. If inspection of a
stenographer's transcript, or any part thereof of the testimony of any 'witness
indorsed on an indictment is permitted . . . it shall not include disclosure of facts
or testimony that would not be admissible in evidence in a trial upon the indict-
ment involved."
Note that discovery of grand jury minutes may not be valuable to the ac-
cused except in the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City. The reason is that those
are the only areas where a grand jury is continually sitting. Expense is a primary
factor in discouraging the use of the grand jury plus the fact that prosecutors
may use informations as readily as grand jury indictments. The number of crimes
committed in those two areas may justify the discovery of grand jury minutes.
15. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, stpra note 11, at 290.
16. 342 Mo. 998, 119 S.W.2d 286 (1938).
17. Id. at 1003, 119 S.W.2d at 288: "Impeachment of witnesses for varia-
tions in testimony before a grand jury at the trial is usually accomplished through
some member of the grand jury or other person lawfully in attendance thereon,
and not from the minutes kept by said body."
18. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, supra note 11, at 290.
19. E.g., Blair's comment in Ex Parte Welborn cited in the text following not
5, supra. The secrecy theory is based upon the premise of assuring that witnessem
will come forth and testify. The argument is that disclosure would result in bribery
and intimidation of witnesses.
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statute or rule.20 In State ex rel. Page v. Terte2l the defendant applied for dis-
covery of documents and certain evidence from the state which "may be ma-
terial." 22 The court denied the motion on the basis that there was no showing of
the evidence's materiality to the defense. The allegation of materiality was merely
a conclusion 2 3 The court quoted the general rule that motions for "fishing exami-
nations" will not be permitted. 24 In the Page case there was also a motion for
production of witnesses' written statements under a civil discovery statute.25 This
motion was also denied for failure to show they were material or admissible in
evidence. Admissibility for impeachment purposes was considered insufficient. 26
The Aubuchon case provides a different criterion:
[Ilf there is a satisfactory showing that a report or statement of a wit-
ness in the hands of the state is of such nature that without it, the de-
fendant's trial would be fundamentally unfair, then it should be pro-
duced; otherwise not.27
Obviously, it is impossible for the defense to bear the burden of proof imposed
by Aubuchon in a situation where the state has evidence of benefit to the de-
fendant, but the accused is ignorant of its existence or is otherwise unable to prove
its benefit because he is unaware of its exact content.
In Brady v. Maryland2s the United States Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution. 29
20. State v. Aubuchon, supra note 7. The rule in regard to defendants' rights
is quoted in the text at note 8, supra. The Aubuchon case has this to say about
discretion: "The propriety of requiring the production for the defendant of docu-
ments such as prior reports and written statements of a witness in the hands of the
state, is in the first instance, a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial
court." 381 S.W.2d at 814.
21. 324 Mo. 925, 25 S.W.2d 459 (En Banc 1930).
22. Id. at 932, 25 S.W.2d at 462.
23. Ibid. In State v. Brown, 360 Mo. 104, 115, 227 S.W.2d 646, 649-50 (1950),
the defendant moved for inspection alleging it was "necessary to defendant to pre-
pare his case for trial." Defendant argued it would show contradictory statements.
The court refused to allow inspection saying: "The application for the inspection
[is] based wholly upon supposition, conjecture and surmise unsupported by
any facts... '
24. 10 R.C.L. p. 1062 § 292 (1915), the rule which the case quotes, reads as
follows: "[A] party to a pending action has no right to call for the books, papers,
and -documents of his adversary merely for the purpose of entering into a 'fishing
examination' of them. To authorize their production, there must be a substantial
showing that the book, paper or document sought for contains material evidence in.
support of the cause of action or defense of the party asking for it. A mere-
suspicion that it contains such evidence does not warrant an order for its produc-
tion."
25. Mo. LAws 1917, at 203, § 1948. § 510.030, RSMo 1959, providing for
Production of documents, papers and tangible objects, is its successor.
26. State ex rel. Page v. Terte, supra note 21, at 931, 25 S.W.2d at 461.
27. State v. Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 814.
28. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
29. Id. at 87.
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Notwithstanding the implications of the Brady case, the case of State v. Spica °
indicates all too clearly that Missouri courts have no intention of aiding de-
fendants in this predicament. In refusing to allow discovery of a witness' state-
ment made to the police and in the state's possession, the court said: "We cannot
say that this statement is favorable to appellant, and we cannot go outside the
record to make that determination."31 (Latter emphasis added.) If the demands
of due process are to be followed in a criminal trial, a defendant must be per-
mitted to make use of favorable material. Constitutional guaranties should not
be thwarted under the guise of procedural refusals to consider evidence. The
legal profession has been trying to rid the judicial system of the "sporting theory
of justice" since the era of trial by combat and compurgation.
State v. Hinojosa2 makes it even more difficult for the criminally accused to
obtain a fair and speedy trial. The court in that case stated:
The court would have had no authority to order the production of ir-
relevant and immaterial matter not admissible in evidence, and this is
true even though, such matters 'might aid in the preparation for trial38
(Emphasis added.)
If the material is not admissible in evidence, it is difficult to visualize damage to
the state. It appears the court is endorsing the promotion of needless delay and
expense on the accused's attempt to prepare for trial by causing the defendant to
expend time and money finding evidence.
In State v. Kelton34 the court avoided the question of whether the civil dis-
covery statute35 applied in criminal cases, but held that assuming it did, there
must be a showing of materiality of the documents requested and the application
must be in writing.36
State ex rel. Phelps v. Mc Queen3 T reduced further the defendant's chances of
obtaining discovery:
Rule 25.19 is not intended as a rule of discovery. Rather, its purpose is
to enforce the production of documents or objects at the trial that con-
tain evidence material and relevant to the issues and to require prior
production and inspection of such records or objects if prior production
and inspection will expedite the trial.38
30. 389 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1965).
31. Id. at 51.
32. 242 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1951).
33. Id. at 6-7.
34. 299 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1957).
35. § 510.030, supra note 25.
36. State v. Kelton, supra note 34, at 497.
37. 296 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. En Banc 1956).
38. Id. at 89. Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.19, upon which the court comments, provides'
"A subpoena duces tecum may be issued by the court or the clerk thereof, upon
application of either party, commanding the person to whom it is directed to pro-
duce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein . . . .The
court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the sub-
poena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the
[Vol. 31
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Inspection of documents or papers used to refresh a witness' recollection has
been required.3 9 However, such an inspection has been refused where the docu-
ments or papers were not used at trial, notwithstanding examination by the wit-
ness before trial. 40 Examination at the pretrial stage should be allowed.
Jencks v. Unzited States,41 which allowed liberal pretrial discovery in the fed-
eral courts, has been held inapplicable in Missouri.42
C. Witnesses
Criminal defendants in Missouri have limited discovery procedures available
whereby they are able to ascertain the names of the witnesses the state will call.4&
However, these statutory provisions are valueless to provide the defendant with
the discovery really needed, and judicial interpretation has seriously limited the
effectiveness of these provisions. The statutory requirement does not include re-
buttal witnesses.44 Indorsement of additional witnesses upon the information or
indictment is largely discretionary and has been allowed even during trial.45 State
v. Farris recommends that the state give the names of the additional witnesses to
the defendant before indorsement.46 To obtain a continuance on the ground of
surprise, the defendant should file an affidavit setting out the specific reasons why
he is prejudiced and needs more time.47 The Farris case points out that "An im-
portant factor is whether the state is acting in good faith and has not purposely
withheld the names of witnesses." 48 Actually, there is no effective sanction for the
state's refusal to indorse all witnesses' names on the indictment.49
time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production
permit the books, papers, documents or portions thereof to be inspected by the
parties and their attorneys."
39. State v. Crayton, 354 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. 1962).
40. State v. Miller, 368 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. 1963).
41. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). In the Jencks case the defendant was allowed pro-
duction of reports of undercover F.B.I. agents which had been made to the F.B.I.
Their use was for impeachment purposes and they had not been introduced in
evidence.
42. The effect of the liberal decision in the Jencks case was subsequently re-
stricted by enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Neither the case nor the statute is im-
portant in light of Missouri holdings. See State v. Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 815;
State v. Mobley, 369 S.W.2d 576, 583 (Mo. 1963).
43. See statutes and rules quoted notes 2 & 3 supra.
44. State v. Jennings, 326 Mo. 1085, 34 S.W.2d 50 (1930); State v. Cook,
318 Mo. 1233, 3 S.W.2d 365 (1928).
45. State v. Farris, 243 S.W.2d 983 (Mo. 1951); State v. Hefflin, 338 Mo.
236, 89 S.W.2d 938 (1936); State v. Short, 337 Mo. 1061, 87 S.W.2d 1031 (1935);
State v. Lowry, 321 Mo. 870, 12 S.W.2d 469 (1929).
46. State v. Farris, supra note 45, at 987.
47. Ibid. State v. Boone, 355 Mo. 550, 196 S.W.2d 794 (1946); State v. Der-
rington, 137 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1940); State v. Wilson, 321 Mo. 564, 12 S.W.2d 445
(1928).
48. State v. Farris, supra note 45, at 986-7.
49. The only consequence may be that the state will not be granted a con-
tinuance when a witness whose name is not indorsed is absent. See § 545.070, RSMo
1959. Indorsing additional witnesses' names on the indictment or the information
at trial has been permitted, and it is not considered as surprise sufficient to set
aside the verdict. Cases cited note 45 sitpra; State v. Nugent, 71 Mo. 136 (1879).
19661
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Present statutes, court rules and case law make no mention of discovery of
names of potential witnesses which the state may have. These witnesses may pro-
vide the most important information for the defendant. The state may not need
to call all of its witnesses before the grand jury in order to indict the defendant.
While the defendant remains ignorant of their existence, the state could subpoena
these witnesses at trial50 to the defendant's disadvantage.
State v. Hawkins finds nothing in any statute requiring furnishing the de-
fendant with the addresses of state witnesses.51 Quite obviously there are many
imaginable situations where knowledge of the addresses would be extremely im-
portant to the defendant. Furthermore, there seems to be no overwhelming public
policy for denying the accused this information. It would save a great deal of
time and expense in the defendant's preparation for trial.
The defendant may use his statutory right of the preliminary hearing to dis-
cover what he can about the state's case.52 At the preliminary hearing an exposure
to the evidence and witnesses the state calls, plus his right of cross-examination,
will greatly aid the defendant; but the defendant may be handicapped if the state
does not call all of its witnesses and introduce all of its evidence.
D. Depositions
The court in State v. Cox flatly states that "A defendant is entitled to take
the depositions of witnesses in a criminal case. . ."53 The Welborn case held that
the extent to which an examination may go is the same as in civil cases.54 A com-
mission to take depositions will be issued as a matter of right even where re-
50. § 545.070, RSMo 1959, states that "other witnesses may be subpoenaed
or sworn by the state ...."
51. 362 Mo. 152, 156, 240 S.W.2d 688, 690 (1951). Specific reference was made
in the case to §§ 545.070, .240, RSMo 1959; see note 2 supra. 23 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 951 (1961) states the general rule: "In the absence of statute, accused can-
not require the state to inform him as to the residences of witnesses whose names
appear on the indictment, even though he may desire such knowledge to ascertain
their standing and credibility."
52. § 544.250, RSMo 1959.
53. 352 S.W.2d 665, 673 (Mo. 1961). The court admitted the privilege of the
defendant to take depositions on the basis of Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.10 which reads:
"A defendant in any criminal case pending in any court may obtain the deposition
of any witness to be used in such case conditionally."
The court in the Cox case also recognized Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.11 as being
applicable. It provides: "[T]he method of taking such depositions shall be gov-
erned by the statutes or rules applicable to civil actions, except as otherwise pro-
vided herein ...."
Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.12 sets out the situations under which depositions are ad-
missible in evidence. See §§ 545.380-.400, RSMo 1959.§ 492.080, RSMo 1959 is substantially the same as Rule 25.10. Under §
492.080, "conditionally" refers to the use of the deposition and not to the taking
of it. See Noell v. Bender, 317 Mo. 392, 295 S.W. 532 (En Banc 1927); Ex Parte
Welborn, 237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 31 (1911).
54. Ex Parte Welborn, supra note 53, at 308, 141 S.W. at 35; State v.
Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Mo. 1964). The court in the Welborn case was
construing Mo. LAws 1872, at 1096, § 13, which has been superseded by § 545.400,
RSMo 1959.
7
Boyd: Boyd: Inadequacy of Pretrial
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
COMMENTS
quested by oral application.55 Furthermore, a grand juror possessing facts bene-
ficial to the defendant may have his deposition taken notwithstanding his oath
of secrecy.56
In light of the Aubuchon ruling,57 the defendant has no right to demand
depositions for discovery. Evidently, they may be used for discovery only at the
discretion of the court. Admissibility in evidence is a prerequisite for taking depo-
sitions. Since they are admissible only in limited circumstances, they are value-
less, particularly from the standpoint of impeachment purposes.58 There are few
elaborative decisions in this area.
E. Confessions and Statements of the Defendant
Prior to December 1, 1965, criminal defendants could not inspect or copy
their own confessions in the possession of the state as a matter of right.6 9 Criminal
Rule 25.195 which took effect on that date reads:
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the
state to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any rel-
evant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, which are known by the attorney for the
state to be within its possession, custody or control, and (2) results or
reports of physical or mental examinations, which are known by the at-
torney for the state to be within the possession, custody or control of the
state.
The interpretation which this rule will be given remains to be seen, but it is a
definite improvement. Criticism of the rule is discussed infra.
III. ARGUMENTS REGARDING MORE LIBERAL DIscovERY6 0
A. Opposing More Liberal Discovery61
The argument most frequently advanced against increased discovery is that
the prosecution is at a disadvantage; therefore, it would be unfair to increase
55. Ex Parte Welborn, supra note 53, at 302, 141 S.W. at 33.
56. Id. at 305-06, 141 S.W. at 34.
57. State v. Aubuchon, supra note 54, at 813. The rule is stated in the text
at note 8, supra.
58. Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.12 sets out the limited circumstances under which
depositions are admissible. In all instances set forth therein the witness is not
before the court. Therefore, there could be no use of the deposition for impeach-
ment purposes.
59. State v. Aubuchon, supra note 54, at 813. The rule is stated in the text
at note 8, supra.
60. See Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963); Com-
ment, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1051 (1961); Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 626 (1951). The
latter two articles summarize the existing law of discovery. The arguments pre-
sented in all three articles have been relied on.
61. The most frequently quoted statement in support of the opposition is
that of Learned Hand in United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923) wherein it was said: "Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not dis-
1966]
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the defendants' advantage. Defendants already have the advantage of being
presumed innocent and cannot be convicted without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. They cannot be forced either to testify or make incriminating statements.
Furthermore, defendants are permitted to suppress the state's evidence under the
proper circumstances. Various methods of discovery are now available to the de-
fendant and are more than adequate to provide the information he desires.
Notwithstanding these discovery techniques, prosecutors are normally cooperative
with defense counsels and disclose evidence willingly.
Due to the large dockets which confront most courts, pleas of guilty are
encouraged in criminal cases. With liberalized discovery such pleas will be re-
duced in number in hope of obtaining further evidence to gain releases and de-
crease penalties.
Present liberal discovery in civil cases should not be extended to criminal
areas because the stakes are higher. Many defendants would resort to any tactic
to gain an acquittal. Civil trials provide for the mutual exchange of evidence;
mutuality would be impossible in criminal cases due to the defendants' constitu-
tional privileges.
Liberal discovery will lead to perjury and tampering with witnesses. If the
defendant is aware of the identity of the witnesses who will testify against him,
he will have the opportunity to bribe or intimidate them into revising their testi-
mony. Persons with information will be reluctant to come forth and testify when
they realize the defendant knows their identity. The fear of reprisal is particularly
great in the case of organized crime. Society and its members are deserving of
protection from criminals and their tactics of harassment, coercion and intimida-
tion.62
Not only should defendants be denied more liberal discovery, but also should
be required to plead the defenses of alibi and insanity when they intend to use them
at trial. This would discourage the use of fabricated alibis and reduce perjury.
B. Favoring More Liberal Discovery
Civil and criminal cases do not differ enough to justify the disparity of avail-
able discovery methods. The element of surprise is always a possibility, and a
close the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment
on, his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the
minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the
whole evidence against him to pick over at his leizure, and make his defense,
fairly or foully, I have never been able to see . . . . Our dangers do not lie in too
little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the
ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and
defeats the prosecution of crime."
State v. Aubuchon, sitpra note 54, concurs: "The state is not permitted in any
possible way to discover facts from a defendant; we are unwilling to open up,
carte blanche, the files of the State to a defendant." 381 S.W.2d at 814.
62. The court in State v. Aubuchon, supra note 54, continued: "We have
reached that point in our criminal jurisprudence where we should consider, and
balance, the rights of the public against some of the recently pressed rights of
the defendants." 381 S.W.2d at 814.
[Vol. 51
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continuance may not rectify the harm that has been done. A criminal trial is as
much a search for truth as is a civil trial. The average defendant in criminal pro-
ceedings will normally be unable to recall all pertinent and relevant facts. This is
more true when the defendant is innocent, was intoxicated at the time the alleged
offense occurred, or is incapable of remembering because of a physical or mental
infirmity (e.g. epilepsy, insanity, amnesia, etc.). In addition, the defendant may
have forgotten much of what he knew and will be unable to refresh his recollec-
tion prior to trial. Without discovery, defendant is unaware of the names of all
witnesses who possess valuable information. He does not possess all of the evi-
dentiary material which is relevant. He is not aware of any scientific tests which
have been conducted (e.g. blood tests, ballistics tests, lie detector tests, etc.), nor
statements given to the state.
Liberalizing discovery will permit the defense to make more effective use of
cross-examination, because disclosure of prior statements by witnesses allows the
defense to show inconsistencies and contradictions. It may also reveal bias, prej-
udice or a prior conviction.
It is desirable that court dockets be reduced. Pleas of guilty will aid this
effort. Counsel, with full knowledge of the facts of the case, will be better able to
advise clients how to plead. Without all the facts, counsel may not plead his
client guilty because of undiscovered facts which may acquit his client. Discovery
allows counsel to make the proper pretrial motions, effectively conduct voir dire
examination and exercise pre-emptory challenges.
Presently the state has the advantage. Its investigative process is more
efficient than any the defendant could hope to utilize. It has the police officers'
interviews and reports.
Prosecuting attorneys may allow defendants discovery as a grace, but this is
probably refused in the more important cases. If the information would prompt a
plea of guilty, it would be disclosed; if it would aid the defendant in the prepara-
tion of his case, it would remain concealed.
The harm caused by the unavailability of discovery is acute in the case of the
indigent defendant. Because of his financial situation, he is neither able to hire
private investigators, nor an experienced, skilled criminal attorney. The indigent
must resign himself to the degree of resourcefulness and proficiency of appointed
counsel.
Rules of discovery should be written for the innocent and mentally responsi-
ble defendant. The exclusionary rule and the Durham rule are of no assistance to
defendants who are legally sane and from whom no evidence has been illegally
seized. 63 The concept of presumption of innocence and the requirement of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are of only theoretical value and their benefit
has been exaggerated. The effect of pleading fifth amendment privileges may
create a more injurious impression in the mind of jurors than testifying and risk-
ing impeachment. Defendant's chances of acquittal are small if he has been im-
peached and the state's witnesses have not been impeached due to the unavail-
ability of discovery.
63. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Bribery and intimidation are scarcely possible for the indigent defendant,
especially if he is not admitted to bail. Organized crime does not increase the dan-
ger as the defendant will discover the state's witnesses regardless of discovery
rules. Risk of perjured testimony is not increased by liberalized discovery; the
guilty defendant, knowing all details, will be able to fabricate a defense while the
innocent defendant will not. Authorities indicate that discovery in civil cases has
probably reduced perjury.64
IV. CONCLUSION: COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS
Existing Missouri law is inadequate to assure that a criminal trial will be an
adjudication of all relevant and material facts bearing on the accused's guilt.
Surely no one would question the following:
The objectives of modem trial procedure should be to promote the fullest
possible presentation of the facts, minimize opportunities for falsification
of evidence, and eliminate the vestiges of trial by combat.05
Without a liberalization of discovery this cannot be possible.
The Missouri Supreme Court has begun to move in the right direction with
its rule authorizing inspection and copying of statements and confessions of the
defendant, and results or reports of physical and mental examinations.0 0 What are
the difficulties which can be foreseen? First, the rule is discretionary in character
("the court nay order" Emphasis added.). The courts have long disallowed dis-
covery by not exercising their discretion. Whether mandatory language is necessary
is only conjecture, but it would seem an improvement.
Second, inspection is permitted only of relevant material. Who is to determine
whether the material is relevant? The court? The prosecution? Or must the de-
fendant demonstrate its relevancy? Consider the intoxicated defendant who does
not know what statements he has made. It would be better to require inspection
upon defendant's motion and deny it only when the prosecution has shown the
material irrelevant. In other words, put the burden on the party who is better
able to prove its relevancy or irrelevancy.
The third problem with the rule is that it relates only to statements, confes-
sions and physical or mental examination reports. Expand the rule to include any
documents, results of scientific tests, lists of potential witnesses, grand jury
minutes and tangible objects and many of the defendant's problems will be solved.
The final problem is that the rule pertains only to statements and confessions
of tk defendant. Discovery of all statements, whether made by witnesses or co-
defendants, should be allowed if it would benefit the defense's preparation for
trial.
It is conceded that the above suggestions may be the zenith of liberal dis-
covery. Perhaps reasonable limitations and checks should be included, but what
64. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.02(2) (2d ed. 1963).
65. Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 626 (1951).
66. See Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.195 quoted in text following note 59, supra.
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these limitations and checks would be and whether they would be effective are two
very difficult questions. Quite possibly none are feasible and this may be the
reason discovery has been left to the discretion of the courts. However, greater
damage is being done under our present system than can be contemplated under a
more liberal discovery procedure.
If discovery is allowed, and it must be, it should also be permitted for use
by the state as the Spica case intimates. 67 It is not unreasonable to require the
accused to plead the defenses of alibi and insanity if he intends to rely on them
at trial,08 and it certainly is consistent with the theme of dispensing with surprise
and promoting complete adjudication of all facts.
The adoption of legislation similar to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures
with proposed amendments would be a step toward solving the dilemma which de-
fendants now face. 69
With the cooperation of the courts, Missouri Rule 25.195 could provide the
solution for many problems. Legislative action, however, is needed to deliver us
from our dark age quagmire, and to provide our criminal trials with at least the
cloak of a true legal proceeding.
EARL E. BoYD
67. State v. Spica, 389 S.W.2d 35, 51 (Mo. 1965).
68. See FED. R. CruM. P. proposed amendment 12.1, which would require the
defendant's giving notice to the government prior to the trial if he plans to defend
on the ground of insanity.
69. See FED. R. CRrm. P. 15, 16 & 17, along with their proposed amendments.
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